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COMMENT
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS: WLL THE UNITED NATIONS' "NORMS"
PROVIDE THE REQUIRED MEANS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently in Buyat Pantai, one of Indonesia's most impoverished
coastal communities where people live with only a single dirt road and
without electricity or running water, something went wrong.' Villag-
ers were afflicted by a variety of illnesses that had never been seen be-
fore in this area.2 They began complaining of dizziness, breathing dif-
ficulties, tumors, skin rashes, and diseases.3 Water and air quality
tests, conducted to determine the source of the illnesses, revealed a
dramatic increase in arsenic and mercury to levels never before seen
in the region. What had changed in this tiny, isolated, and autono-
mous coastal village? The answer is the arrival of Newmont Mining
Corporation (Newmont), a U.S.-based multi-billion dollar gold pro-
ducer, and its gold mine near Buyat Bay.
The Indonesian government and its citizens have filed civil
charges against Newmont for polluting the air and water, and for mak-
ing its people sick.4 The company's executives deny any wrongdoing
and insist that everywhere Newmont does business, it adheres to U.S.
environmental laws, which are often more stringent than those of de-
veloping countries.'
1. Michael Casey, Indonesian Villagers Sue Firm for Polluting; World's Largest Gold-
Mining Company at Centre of Environmental Storm, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Nov. 29, 2004,
at A16.
2. Id.
3. Patrick Goodenough, US Mining Giant Faces Trial in Indonesia Over Pollution
Claims, CNSNEwS, Dec. 9, 2004, http://www.cnsnews.com/ForeignBureaus/archive/
200412/FOR20041209a.html; Jane Perlez, Mining Giant Told it Put Toxic Vapors into Indo-
nesia's Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at Al.
4. Goodenough, supra note 3.
5. See discussion of Newmont's environmental record infra Part l. A.
217
1
Schmidt: Transnational Corporate Responsibility for International Environm
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
218 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
The tragedies at Buyat Bay draw attention to larger issues arising
in international law. Specifically, there is a lack of certainty regarding
what law controls transnational corporations (TNCs), and what regula-
tions are in place to safeguard the people and natural resources of
countries hosting TNCs.6 Each nation has its own set of laws to pro-
tect the environment and the health of its citizens. However, when a
TNC exploits a host country's natural resources and harms its land,
developing countries often fail to enforce these laws because they fear
the company will leave and take its jobs and dollars with it. Today,
developing countries are asked to trade health and safety for the pro-
gress and prosperity promised by the economic ventures of TNCs.
Presently, without any binding international law to protect host coun-
tries, individual nations find themselves in a difficult situation.
In August 2003, the United Nations enacted the Norms on the Re-
sponsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business En-
terprises with Regard to Human Rights (Norms), a voluntary set of
human rights principles, which include international environmental
law guidelines.7 These principles provide non-binding guidelines for
TNCs and other business enterprises to abide by while operating in
any country. 8 The critical question is whether this "soft law"9 will be
enough to stop the environmental exploitation and degradation of de-
veloping countries.
Part II of this Comment examines the history and background of
human rights and the environment. Part III describes the case against
Newmont, including the allegations and procedural history. A de-
tailed analysis of the Norms is set out in Part IV. Finally, Part V dis-
cusses how the Norms can be used and explains why binding legisla-
tion is desperately needed.
This Comment concludes by finding that the Norms offer guide-
lines that represent a step in the right direction, however, the Norms
are simply not enough. TNCs exploit countries that are rich in natural
resources but poor in economic vitality, polluting the air and water
and damaging the health of indigenous people. TNCs do so free from
6. See discussion of the need for binding international regulation infra Part V.B.
7. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business En-
terprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26,
2003), available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html [hereinafter
Norms].
8. Id.
9. See discussion on the difference between hard and soft law infra Part IV.A.
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prosecution and redress because binding international law governing
how TNCs operate does not yet exist.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Degrading the environment has an adverse effect on the quality of
life and can often lead to violations of human rights.'" The General
Assembly of the United Nations has declared that preserving the
earth's natural resources is "a prerequisite for a normal life of man."''
These rights are vital for indigenous people because they often rely on
every aspect of their immediate environment in its natural state for
survivall 2-such as water, trees, food, health, housing, traditional live-
lihood, and culture.' 3 Harm to these natural resources is often both ir-
reversible and life threatening, as these harms negatively impact the
immediate health and safety of individuals. 4
A critical dilemma in the international environmental and human
rights arena involves developing countries, their indigenous people,
and the exploitation of their environment. As established in the very
first international environmental conference held in 1972, the primary
concern of the "South"' 5 is economic development.'6 This position
10. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1281 (2d
ed. 2002).
11. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 664
(3d ed. 2004) (citing G.A. Res. 35/7, U.N. Doe. A/RES/35/8 (Oct. 30, 1980)).
12. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1283.
13. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 11, at 664 (quoting Klaus Toepfer, Executive Director
of the United Nations Environment Protection in a statement to the Fifty-Seventh Session of
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2001).
14. Brief for Center for Human Rights and the Environment and Center for Interna-
tional Environmental Law, as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, Ass'n of Lhaka Honhat
Aboriginal Communities (Nuestra Tierra/Our Land) v. Argentina, Precautionary Measures
Request, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2000) (No. P12.094) (case ended in a settlement), available at
http://www.cedha.org.ar/docs/curiae2.htm, reprinted in DAVID HUNTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1281 (2d ed. 2002).
15. The "South" does not denote countries geographically located in the south, but
rather is a way for environmentalists to classify a group with characteristics of high popula-
tion, high poverty, and high biodiversity. Id. at 167. These are usually developing countries.
Id. The "North" refers to nations that are relatively wealthy, and have substantial economic
development, high literacy rates, and positive health indicators. Id. The "North" includes the
United States, Canada, Europe, former Soviet Union, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Id.
at 166-67.
Many developing countries are in the southern hemisphere, but not all, and visa-versa. The
tendency to group North and South is helpful in distinguishing because the goals of most de-
veloping countries are the same when it comes to an environmental agenda. See generally
Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulations and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE
L.J. 2039, 2102-05 (1993) reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY
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was initially advanced at the U.N. Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment at Stockholm 7 and still held true at the Johannesburg World
Summit of 2002.18 Regrettably, developing countries are frequently
willing to sacrifice environmental and human rights to further devel-
opment because creating a vigorous economy is a strong desire and
goal. 9 The international community attempted to respond to this
trade-off by establishing "third generation rights," which grant rights
to a quality environment, development, and peace.2' However, many
developing countries have less stringent environmental standards than
industrialized countries; 21 as a result, TNCs can establish a more prof-
itable business in developing countries, because they are not often
forced to comply with the strict environmental standards of their home
country.22
In those developing countries that do have strict environmental
laws, the laws are often not enforced. A research study in Brazil,
Mexico, Indonesia, and the Philippines found that even if countries
452-53 (Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996) (discussing how a variety of factors,
including social, cultural, historic and economic, lead to varying governmental responses to
environmental issues). The goals of most countries in the "North" are also the same, but
sharply differ with those of the "South." Id.; HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 167.
16. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 166-67.
17. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed.,
June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972), available at http://www.unep.org/ Docu-
ments/Default.asp?DocumentlD=97&ArticlelD=1503. The conference was the basis for the
Stockholm Declaration. Id. Principle 8 states "[e]conomic and social development is essen-
tial for ensuring a favorable living and working environment for man and for creating condi-
tions on earth that are necessary for the improvement of the quality of life." Id. Principle 9
declares that certain problems in developing countries can be remedied by the expedited de-
velopment of those countries through assistance with finances and technology. Id.
18. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Afr., Aug. 26 - Sept.
4, 2002, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 9, U.N. Doc A/CONF.
199/20 (Sept. 4, 2002) available at http://www.johannesburgsummit.orgfhtml
/documents/documents.html [hereinafter Johannesburg Summit]. Johannesburg World Sum-
mit on Sustainable Development, held in August and September of 2002, was the third major
international environmental conference. Id A key principle under Poverty Eradication is a
goal to establish a world solidarity fund to "promote social and human development in the
developing countries." Id.
19. HUNTER, supra note 10, at 166-67.
20. VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY
FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 455 (2003) (citing S.P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Gen-
eration for the 1980s?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 442 (1981)). Third generation rights are
those which are required and that may be called upon against the state. Id. These differ from
first, which define personal liberties that governments have assumed the right to respect. Id.
at 454-55. They also differ from second-generation rights, which define social rights that call
for affirmative action by governments. Id.
21. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 453.
22. Id. at 451 (reasoning that "requiring the polluter to pay ensures" costs are born by
the polluter and not society at large).
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have penalties, the probability of being charged and convicted is ex-
tremely low.23 Very few perpetrators are even fined. 24 Indonesia, for
example, has a long-standing reputation for being soft on regulating
environmental issues.25 The study also found that less than one per-
cent of environmental crimes in these regions end in punishment.26
Likewise, the Indonesian Center for Environmental Law claims
that there are sufficient regulations and environmental laws; the real
problem is that administrators are not motivated to enforce them.27 In
Indonesia, corporations regularly bribe government officials to escape
penalties.28 Weak enforcement results in TNCs engaging in illegal ac-
tivity in biodiverse countries.29 Environmental groups claim that if
administrators continue to treat industry as paramount, officials will
remain oblivious to corporations' role in destroying the environment. 0
Corporate analysts can easily calculate economic statistics to
show the financial rewards of breaking environmental laws when op-
erating in a developing country.3 The results show profits are larger
when operating in developing nations, rather than in an industrialized
country with established and enforced environmental laws.32  Fur-
thermore, governments and TNCs often violate civil rights by harshly
suppressing those who oppose ecologically destructive development.33
This practice further supports treating environmental destruction as a
human rights abuse. 34
As early as 1968, the U.N. General Assembly acknowledged the
close relationship between human rights and the environment .3  The
relationship between a healthy environment and protection of human
23. Environmental Crimes Go Unpunished in Biodiverse Countries, Report Says, 42
CLEAN WATER REP. 244 (2004) [hereinafter Environmental Crimes].
24. Id.
25. Zakki Hakim, Industry, Officials in Bed Together While Jakartans Choke, JAKARTA
POST, July 31, 2003, available at http://www.pelangi.or.id/media.php?mid=86.
26. Environmental Crimes, supra note 23.
27. Hakim, supra note 25 (quoting Senior Researcher at the Indonesian Center for Envi-
ronmental Law, Sukanda Husin).
28. Hakim, supra note 25 (quoting Chairman of the Environmental Task Force, Ahmad
Safrudin).
29. Environmental Crimes, supra note 23.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Richard Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A
Practical Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2000), reprinted in DAVID HUNTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1282-83 (2d ed. 2002).
34. Id.
35. Problems of the Human Environment, G.A. Res. 2398 (XXII), U.N. Doc. A/L
553/Add. (Dec. 3, 1968).
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rights is becoming an increasingly important issue on the international
community's agenda. 36 These issues have emerged into the following
four principles. 37 The first principle involves human rights that re-
quire effective protection of the environment. 38 The second focuses
on environmental degradation that subsequently prohibits full realiza-
tion of fundamental rights.39 The third principle establishes a right to
a safe and healthy environment.4" Finally, current international envi-
ronmental law creates legal and ethical duties that require such protec-
tion.41
The crucial question is whether the necessary means exist to hold
corporations accountable in an increasingly global economy and soci-
ety.4 2 Often when only one state drafts a code of conduct to regulate
other states, the results may not be what were anticipated and hence
compliance does not always follow. 43 However, when the interna-
tional community joins together, with each country taking an active
part in drafting a code of conduct, the document has a much greater
chance of being a success. A healthy environment involves a multi-
tude of private and government actors in many countries, therefore,
the mechanism to properly implement the right must be created at the
international level.'
Today, the United Nations employs a Special Rapporteur on Hu-
man Rights and the Environment.45 This post now performs crucial
fact-gathering missions and details extensive reporting requirements
for countries.' The function of the Rapporteur reflects a self-
regulation that is also advanced in the Global Compact, recommended
by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and established in 2000.4" The
Global Compact is defined as a "direct initiative" but asks volunteer
companies to comply through "public accountability, transparency,
and [their] enlightened self-interest."48  The United Nations boasts
36. NANDA & PRING, supra note 20, at 453.
37. Kiss & SHELTON, supra'note 11, at 663.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Herz, supra note 33, at 1283.
43. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 11, at 98.
44. NANDA & PRING, supra note 20, at 455.
45. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1285.
46. Id.
47. Troy Rule, Comment, Using "Norms" to Change International Law: UN Human
Rights Laws Sneaking in Through the Back Door?, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 325, 327 (2004).
48. Id. (quoting The Global Compact, About the Global Compact, http://www. un-
globalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp?).
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2005], Art. 16
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol36/iss1/16
2005] TNC's RESPONSIBILITY FOR INT'L ENVT'L AND HR VIOLATIONS 223
"that the Global Compact is 'not a regulatory instrument"' with any
policing or enforcement of its principles or any interference with
countries.4 9 Numerous non-profit organizations also monitor corpora-
tions' activities by initiating their own fact-finding missions. Am-
nesty International5" prides itself on "the impartial protection of hu-
man rights," rather than supporting or opposing any government or
political group and advocates establishing binding law.5 Considering
that prior to the Norms the United Nations had not developed any le-
gal obligations, its actions show it finds binding law is unnecessary.
However, by creating the Norms, the United Nations appears to be
heading in the other direction. The case of Newmont Mining Com-
pany highlights the results if this direction is followed.
III. INDONESIA v. NEWMONT MINING CORPORATION
A. Newmont's Environmental Record
Newmont Mining Corporation is the world's top gold producer,52
employing approximately 14,000 people around the world and gener-
ating annual revenue of $3.2 billion.5 3  Headquartered in Denver,
Colorado, it produced more than 200 tons of gold in 2003.14 With
gold in high demand, Newmont is in a good position.5 Newmont as-
serts as part of its corporate culture and values that safety is first, and
the environment is second.56 The company prides itself on being
committed to "health and safety for its employees and neighboring
communities."57 Newmont claims its corporate philosophy is to take
the more stringent U.S. environmental standards with it around the
49. Id.
50. Peter Benenson created Amnesty International in Great Britain in 1961. Amnesty
Int'l, Peter Benenson's Biography, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/amnesty/history
/biography.shtml (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).
51. Amnesty Int'l, About Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/ abou-
tai-index-eng (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).
52. Reuters, Indonesia Court Says Newmont Detentions Illegal, Dec. 24, 2005, avail-
able at http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=28700 [hereinafter
Newmont Detentions Illegal].
53. Newmont Mining Corp., Profile, http://www.newmont.comlen/about/profile
/index.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Profile]; Michael Riley & Greg Griffin, The
High Cost of Gold, THE DENV. POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at AO1.
54. Riley & Griffin, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Profile, supra note 53.
7
Schmidt: Transnational Corporate Responsibility for International Environm
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
224 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
world.58 "We have an excellent environmental record worldwide,"
said Wayne Murdy, CEO.5 9
However, Newmont does not abide by the U.S. standards even in
the United States. Newmont's Lone Ranch Mine is Nevada's second
largest toxic chemical polluter. 60  The company's own monitoring
shows that Newmont has continually violated state and federal regula-
tions.6' It is also highly doubtful that Newmont actually abides by
U.S. standards around the globe. In December 2004, in response to
the exposure of company reports evidencing Newmont's release of
mercury into the air, two top Newmont executives denied that they
acted outside any law; they also denied ever harming anyone. 62 How-
ever, in a 2001 company memorandum, the senior vice president,
Lawrence Kurlander, wrote "that Newmont had 'told the world' it up-
held American environmental" standards but admitted that the state-
ment was in fact a lie.63
Lawsuits, internal and government-mandated reports, and inter-
views uncovered substantial environmental violations at Newmont's
worldwide mines. 64 Former employees have complained that New-
mont often minimizes or completely dismisses environmental con-
cerns generated internally; the company has been accused of retaliat-
ing against employees who voiced their concerns. 65 Employees claim
that Newmont makes a practice of pushing the limit of environmental
laws and engaging in evaluating risks of being penalized. 66 An envi-
ronmental compliance officer employed by Newmont at Lone Tree
claimed that what Newmont alleges as its environmental standard is
not what it practices. 67 Mounting lawsuits against Newmont support
58. Press Release, Newmont Mining Corp., Newmont Responds to New York Times
Article of December 22 (Dec. 22, 2004), http://www.newmont.co.id/buyat/pressdetail.
php?lang=E&bpressid=ELWE1 2593354&bpresstipe=5 [hereinafter Newmont Responds].
59. Environmental Hazard: Newmont CEO Admits Mercury Leaks in Indonesia Mine
Projects, MEDICAL LETTER ON THE CDC & FDA, Jan. 16, 2005, at 52 [hereinafter Environ-
mental Hazard].
60. Riley & Griffin, supra note 53.
61. Id.
62. Perlez, supra note 3.
63. Id.
64. Riley & Griffin, supra note 53. These findings were part of an investigation per-
formed by the Denver Post. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Turkish mine's former manager of government relations said Newmont
used its political connections in exchange to sidestep Turkish law. Id.
67. Id.
8
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these allegations. Around the world, suits have been filed in Nevada,
Turkey, Peru, and Indonesia.68
For example, Newmont understated cyanide levels in discharge
water from its Turkish mine, where the cyanide is used to extract gold
from the Aegean coast soil.69 Since 1994, Newmont's operation of the
mine has been hindered by a legal conflict with local citizens over its
cyanide use.7" The Turkish Supreme Court finally closed the mine in
August 2004, holding that the government order under which New-
mont was operating was illegal.7" Since then, Newmont applied for
permits to restart the mine until it sold the mine on March 2, 2005, as-
serting that the mine no longer fit its asset portfolio.
72
Hasan Gokvardar, one of the mine's former managers, claimed he
received death threats due to his readiness to publicly discuss issues
concerning the mine.73 Gokvardar claims Newmont evaded Turkish
law by using its political connections.74 In 2003, Gokvardar testified
in a Turkish court regarding a Newmont internal lab analysis that
showed cyanide levels twenty-eight times higher than previously re-
ported and nine times than the government regulation permitted.75
Newmont submitted a report to Turkish regulators showing that cya-
nide levels leaving its detoxification plant and entering its tailings dam
were well under Turkish safety limits. 76 Newmont explained the in-
consistency as a malfunction that caused cyanide levels to surge but
then return to regulated levels; it claimed the internal report was accu-
rate, though uncharacteristic.77 This explanation seems somewhat
perplexing.
Another lawsuit was filed against Newmont in Peru for allegedly
poisoning 1100 local inhabitants.78 The company is continuing set-
tlement talks with plaintiffs and has already spent $16 million to clean
the site.79 An internal company review stated that the company's
sediment filters were immensely insufficient, allowing sediment con-
68. Id.; Casey, supra note 1; Perlez, supra note 3.
69. Riley & Griffin, supra note 53.
70. Id.; see also Same (G)old Story, EARTH ISLAND J., Mar. 22, 2005, at 8.
71. Gargi Chakrabarty, Newmont Sells Disputed Gold Mine in Turkey, DENV. ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 2, 2005, at 8B.
72. Id.
73. Riley & Griffin, supra note 53.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Casey, supra note 1.
79. Id.
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taining heavy metals into rivers. 80 The company's cyanide treatment
facilities were inadequate in size, causing the facilities to malfunction
and exceed acceptable levels.8' In September 2004, after two weeks
of protests, Peruvian officials retracted a permit that would have en-
abled Newmont to enlarge its mining operations.8 2
B. Buyat Pantai Civil Suits
Three Buyat Bay residents filed civil suits against Newmont in
Indonesia totaling $543 million.83 Newmont, in turn, filed a suit
against a non-government organization (NGO) official over his accu-
sations that Newmont's mine emissions caused mercury poisoning. 84
The villagers withdrew their suits when a settlement was reached, and
as a result, Newmont withdrew its cross-suit against the NGO offi-
cial. 85 As part of the settlement, Newmont insisted residents acknowl-
edge that their claims were baseless. 86 However, after the settlement
had been reached, plaintiffs said their attorneys conspired with New-
mont and that they never agreed to the settlement.87
The Indonesian government filed a separate civil suit against
Newmont. In the suit, the government charged Newmont with dis-
charging 5.5 million tons of waste containing arsenic and mercury into
Buyat Bay from 1996 to 2004.88 Environmentalists claim Newmont's
waste caused 80% of the 300 inhabitants of Buyat Pantai to become
ill, suffering from diseases that even the doctors cannot identify.89
The suit names six Newmont officials and Newmont Minahasa Raya,
Newmont's local subsidiary.' The Indonesian government claims
80. Riley & Griffin, supra note 53.
81. Id.
82. Same (G)old Story, supra note 70.
83. US $543m Suit Against Newmont Halted, NAT'L POST, Dec. 29, 2004, at 10;
Reuters, Newmont Says Indonesian Civil Suit Withdrawn, Dec. 29, 2005, available at
http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=28713 [hereinafter Civil Suit
Withdrawn].
84. Civil Suit Withdrawn, supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. Settlement Agreement, Newmont Minahasa Raya v. Pangememan, at 2-3, available
at http://www.buyatbayfacts.com/pdfs-docs/Perjanjian%20Perdamaian%20 (Settlement%20
Agreement).pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
87. Tony Hotland & Muninggar Sri Saraswati, Lawyers Conspired with Newmont: Lo-
cals, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 8, 2005, at 2. Neither Newmont's attorneys nor plaintiffs have a
copy of the settlement with their signatures. Id
88. Casey, supra note 1.
89. Id.
90. Newmont Detentions Illegal, supra note 52.
10
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that Newmont is guilty of violating three laws, each carrying maxi-
mum ten-year jail terms.9'
The first cause of action alleges that Newmont falsely reported the
depth of the Buyat Bay thermocline layer in its environmental impact
analysis report to the Indonesian Environmental Ministry.92 New-
mont's vice president for environmental affairs, David A. Baker, said
that the submerged pipe used for transporting waste into the bay had
been installed as stated in its environmental impact statement to the
government.93 The Indonesian government appointed an integrated
team to perform a study of pollution in the bay. 94 The team collected
their findings and compiled a report (Government Report). The team
found that Newmont had dumped its tailing above rather than below
the thermocline layer, thereby causing mercury to dissolve into and
contaminate the bay's water.9 The Government Report showed sea-
bed arsenic levels were "10 times the levels allowed in the U.S." 96
Research also showed arsenic levels 100 times higher in the sediment
near Newmont's disposal site than in other parts of the bay. 97 A team
comprised of personnel from various ministries and institutions con-
cluded that the bay was polluted.98
Newmont vigorously challenged the Government Report.9 9 Baker
claimed that when the Government Report was issued the arsenic was
static, had not penetrated the food chain, and therefore was of no
91. Karima Anjani, Reuters, Jakarta Says No Deal for Newmont in Pollution Case,
Sept. 12, 2004, available .at http://www.plantark.com/avantgo/dailynewsstory.
cfm?newsid=28503.
92. Indonesian Govt to Monitor Buyat Bay Case, ASIA PULSE, Dec. 16, 2004. The
company's waste disposal system must be in accordance with Law 23/1997. Abdul Khalik,
Newmont Manager Named Suspect, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 2, 2004, at 1.
93. Jane Perlez, Indonesia to Press Pollution Suit Against U.S. Mining Company, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A4.
94. Indonesian Govt to Monitor Buyat Bay Case, supra note 92.
95. Id. The thermocline layer was 110 meters to 300 meters below sea level, however,
Newmont Minahasa Raya disposed of its mercury waste far from the thermocline layer, at
only 82 meters. Id. The waste must be dumped below the thermocline layer or the tailings,
mercury in this case, can dissolve and therefore contaminate the water. Khalik, supra note
92.
96. Goodenough, supra note 3; see also Khalik, supra note. 92 (where a test of 40 me-
ters below the surface of Buyat Bay showed a level of mercury and arsenic at 5.5 micro-
gram/liter and 50.70 microgram/liter, far above the legal standard of 1 microgram/liter for
mercury and 12 microgram/liter for arsenic established in Decree No. 51/2004).
97. Casey, supra note 1.
98. Newmont/Buyat Bay Verification Team Has No Doubt on the Finding by the Joint
Technical Team, MININGINDO, Nov. 25, 2004, http://www.miningindo.com. But see Civil Suit
Withdrawn, supra note 83 (where previous reports issued by the World Health Organization
and Indonesia's Environmental Ministry assert the bay is clean).
99. Perlez, supra note 93.
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harm." However, Newmont's critics disagreed and claimed the arse-
nic had dissolved and was absorbed by the benthos species'01 that are
eaten by the fish in Buyat Bay. 0 2 The Government Report confirmed
that due to contamination the benthos population had dramatically de-
creased; the density of benthos species in Buyat Bay was reduced
from seven to fourteen to only one to four.103 Newmont argued such
conclusions were unattainable because standards did not exist for met-
als in benthos.' °  Newmont instead suggested the government use
standards for fish consumed by humans, which are much closer to the
top of the food chain, and are readily ascertainable. 5 Newmont
claimed the fish were safe."0
Newmont has adamantly denied polluting the bay; "[w]e have al-
ways maintained that Newmont has not polluted Buyat Bay."' 07 In
fact, Newmont denied using mercury in its operation at all. 08 It also
denied violating U.S. or Indonesian law or harming anyone" and
claimed the afflictions were caused by poor sanitation and nutrition. 0
On another occasion, Newmont asserted that illegal miners who oper-
ated nearby polluted the bay by discharging mercury into water-
ways."'
The second alleged violation is Newmont's failure to obtain a
mandatory license for its detoxification process. 112 The third cause of
100. Id.
101. Goodenough, supra note 3. "Benthos" refers to the benthic invertebrate commu-
nity that lives on the ocean floor including starfish, oysters, clams, sea cucumbers, brittle stars
and anemone. New Hampshire Public Television, Nature Works: Benthos, http://www.
nhptv.org/natureworks/nwep6j.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2005); Chesapeake Bay Benthic
Monitoring Program, What are Benthos?, http://www.esm.versar.com/Vcb/Benthos/ ben-
thos.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2005). They primarily get their food as it floats by or by scav-
enging on the ocean floor. Id.
102. Goodenough, supra note 3.
103. Indonesian Govt to Monitor Buyat Bay Case, supra note 92.
104. Goodenough, supra note 3.
105. Id. But see supra Part IHI.B discussing studies which were conducted and verified
and did not show normal levels of arsenic and mercury.
106. See Goodenough, supra note 3.
107. Civil Suit Withdrawn, supra note 83.
108. Casey, supra note 1.
109. Perlez, supra note 3.
110. Same (G)old Story, supra note 70. In a recent press release, Rick Ness, Newmont
Minahasa Raya's President Director said, "the mine complied with regulations, caused no pol-
lution and was never notified by the government that it had caused pollution." See Press Re-
lease, PT Newmont Minahasa Raya, PTMNR Disappointed in Decision Objects to President
Director Unfairly Facing Trial, (Sept. 20, 2005), available at www.buyatbayfacts.com
/pdfsdocs/05-09-20%2Final%2OPress%20Release%20ENG.pdflang=E&bpresstipe=5.
111. Id.
112. Indonesian Govt to Monitor Buyat Bay Case, supra note 92.
12
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action is a violation of environmental standards of hazardous and toxic
materials.113 In addition, officials at Indonesia's Environmental Min-
istry claim that Newmont had breached its contract that promised to
respect Indonesia's environment and its laws. 114
Newmont denied violating environmental standards, even after
Indonesia lowered its emission limit. 115  Newmont's CEO, Wayne
Murdy, says Newmont was well below Indonesian and U.S. standards
when he admitted discharging thirty-three tons of mercury in the air
and water over a five-year period.1 6 However, the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency claimed that thirty-three tons of mercury is
an extremely disturbing amount to release into the air and water.'17
Newmont simply would not be allowed to operate that way in the
United States. 8
Newmont stated that there were no Indonesian air quality stan-
dards in place at the time construction began on the Minahasa Raya
plant. 119 Newmont claimed it looked to Nevada's'20 standards for
point source mercury pollution.121 However, no such standards ex-
isted in Nevada at the time. 22 The company did use the ambient air
quality standard derived from an occupational health exposure limit
for mercury. 123  Because emissions from the Minahasa plant would
have exceeded that limit, Newmont installed a scrubber, which was
meant to act as an air purification system. 24 However, when the In-
donesian government strengthened its emissions standards, detractors
say Newmont never re-assessed its pollution-control equipment.125
Newmont conducted a confidential company review in 2001 to
evaluate the pollution caused by its mines and ultimately determined
that the scrubber designed to clean mercury from the smokestack ex-
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Newmont Responds, supra note 58.
116. Environmental Hazard, supra note 59.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Newmont Responds, supra note 58.
120. Nevada is the primary place of operation for Newmont in the United States. Pro-
file, supra note 53.
121. Newmont Responds, supra note 58.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. Newmont also created air pollution models that suggested levels may exceed
their self-imposed Nevada-based standards when ore containing higher mercury levels would
be processed through a point source. Id.
125. Riley & Griffin, supra note 53.
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haust was often turned off or malfunctioning. 126 This lack of pollution
control caused toxic mercury fumes to be released into the air. 27 Crit-
ics claim the danger of airborne mercury alone should have been suf-
ficient to prompt precaution.128
To dispose of its waste, Newmont uses a practice known as sub-
marine tailing disposal. 129 This technique has divided the mining in-
dustry and is not allowed in the United States because it violates the
Clean Water Act.13° This practice is also banned in Canada. 131 "[T]he
circumstances in which the technology could be considered acceptable
are rare," says BHB Billiton Ltd., the world's largest mining com-
pany, in explaining why it does not utilize the practice. 32 Newmont
defended itself by saying that land-based disposal was risky because
of the earthquake potential in Indonesia.'33 However, Friends of the
Earth Indonesia argue that using the ocean to dispose of tons of mine
waste "is irresponsible, outdated and unsustainable.' 34
Despite Newmont's claims of innocence, Indonesian officials de-
termined that Newmont would stand trial. 35 Indonesia's Environ-
mental Minister, Rachmat Witoelar, declared that Indonesia will not
bargain with Newmont and the company will have to defend itself in
court. 3 6 The Indonesian Anti-Corruption Coalition pressed the Indo-
nesian Supreme Court to review the holding to guarantee Newmont's
corporate responsibility.137 Witoelar had already begun trying the case
publicly.'38 He claimed Newmont was trying to cut corners to boost
its profits, Newmont knew all along about the release of mercury, and
the company failed to properly report it. 39 Had Newmont reported it,
Witoelar claims he could have warned citizens."4
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Jane Perlez & Evelyn Rusli, Indonesia: Spurred by Illness, Indonesians Lash Out
at Newmont Mining, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at Al.
130. 33 U.S.C.A § 131 l(a) (2005) (prohibiting the discharge of any pollutant into navi-
gable waters).
131. Casey, supra note 1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Anjani, supra note 91.
136. Id.
137. Indonesia Environment Group Says Newmont Must Stand Trial Despite Court Rul-
ing, AFX EUROPEAN Focus, Dec. 24, 2004.
138. Dorothy Kosich, Newmont's Buyat Bay Accusers Recant, MINEWEB, Jan. 11, 2005,
http://www.mineweb.net/sections/sustainable-mining/400922.htm.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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In February 2005, after being investigated for nearly six months,
the case encountered a major obstacle. Jane Pangemanan, the original
doctor who helped prompt the testing of the bay due to illnesses she
had seen in her patients in Buyat Pantai, retracted her statements. 141
She claimed no one coerced or threatened her to withdraw her previ-
ous statements. 4 2  Pangemanan also said her accusations claiming
Newmont caused the diseases suffered by residents were premature
and without conclusive data. 143
However, because of Pangemanan's claims, Newmont sued her
for defamation.'" A settlement has been reached between Pange-
manan and Newmont. 14 5 As a result of Pangemanan's renunciation,
the suit was delayed."4 This defamation suit was the same type of
SLAPP 147 suit Newmont brought against the Legal Aid Foundation for
Health in response to civil suits filed by citizens suffering from skin
diseases in Buyat Pantai.148
Scientists developed additional evidence that supports Dr. Pange-
manan's original claims. Robert Moran, a hydrogeologist and geo-
chemist from Golden, Colorado, was on the verification team that
concluded that the bay was polluted.149 He found that the marine life
in Buyat Bay contained arsenic and mercury at hazardous levels.'50
Moran's discovery supports Dr. Pangemanan's claim that fish from
the bay caused the residents' illnesses. At this point, the Indonesian
government has indicted both Newmont Minahasa Raya, and its
President Richard Ness. 151
141. Newmont's Indonesian Unit Says Plaintiff in Pollution Case Dropped Her
Charges, AFX ASIA, Feb. 14, 2005.
142. Gargi Chakrabarty, Newmont Waste Claims Dropped; Indonesian: Complaints
Against Mine 'Premature', RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 16, 2005, at lB.
143. Newmont's Indonesian Unit Says Plaintiff in Pollution Case Dropped Her
Charges, supra note 141.
144. Julie Bresnick, Accuser Nixes Pollution Claim vs. Newmont, AM. METAL MARKET,
Feb. 17, 2005, at 1; World Watch: Asia/Pacific: Indonesian Doctor Retracts Newmont Accu-
sation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005, at A13.
145. Settlement Agreement, supra note 86.
146. World Watch Asia Pacific: Indonesian Doctor Retracts Newmont Accusation, su-
pra note 144.
147. SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. Black's Law
Dictionary ( 8 1h ed. West 2004). "The hallmark of a SLAPP suit is that it lacks merit, and is
brought with the goal of obtaining an economic advantage over a citizen party by increasing
the cost of litigation." Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 681 (9th Cir. 2005).
148. See generally Kosich, supra note 138.
149. Chakrabarty, supra note 142.
150. Id.
151. Jonathan Hopfner, Indonesia Court Rejects Newmont's Bid to Have Criminal Pol-
lution Case Dismissed, 28 INT'L ENV'T REP. 681 (2005).
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On March 10, 2005, the Indonesian government filed formal civil
charges against Newmont, charging it with polluting Buyat Bay and
causing $134 million worth of damage. 15 2 Rachmat Witoelar said en-
vironmental destruction, for example the cost of restoring the coast,
was the key factor in calculating damages.153 A Newmont spokesper-
son asserted that the suit and damages were not based on scientific
data.54
Newmont Minahasa Raya filed a motion to have the case dis-
missed because it was flawed.'55 Ness claimed there was no Indone-
sian law that could hold him personally liable for the corporation's ac-
tivities." 6 Furthermore, Ness claimed that the indictment lacked
sufficient evidence. 57 Nevertheless, in August 2005 an Indonesian
court refused to dismiss the case. 158 Based on the tremendous amount
of persuasive evidence confirming that the bay was polluted, the In-
donesian government should be aggressively pursuing litigation.
Moran says the lack of substantive science is disappointing. '59
Earthworks, an NGO, is actively involved in the case. 160 Earth-
works' International Campaign Manager, Radhika Sarin, met with
Buyat Bay residents last year and claimed the case was not over yet. 161
She added that the community and organizations such as her own can
ensure "that the pressure is still on."'162 However, Sarin went on to say
that Earthworks lacked the capability to take legal action due to eco-
nomic disparities.'63
152. Shawn Donnan & Taufan Hidayat, Indonesia Files Suit Minahasa Raya Mine,
FINANCIAL TIMES UK, Mar. 11, 2005. But see Gargi Chakrabarty, Newmont Sued Over Pollu-
tion Charges Indonesia Seeks $117 in Suit, DEN. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 10, 2005
(claiming the damages were $117 million); Govt to Seek $100m from Newmont, JAKARTA
POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at 4, available at 2005 WLNR 3713671 (claiming the damages were
$100 million). Prior to Dr. Pangemanan's retraction of her accusations, she estimated damage
to the bay could have been as high as $700 million. Govt May Ask for $700mfrom Newmont,
JAKARTA POST, Feb. 3, 2005, at 4.
153. Govt to Seek $oom from Newmont, supra note 152.
154. Chakrabarty, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Chakrabarty, supra note 142.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
16
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IV. UNITED NATIONS' NORMS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH
REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS
A. History
TNCs have historically self-regulated their international opera-
tions regarding human rights and the environment.' r ' Today, there is
little international law that clearly states the human right to a healthy
environment. 165 There is even less international law regulating corpo-
rations. 166  Some of the most overlooked and powerful non-
governmental actors in the human rights arena are TNCs and other
business enterprises. 167
There is no applicable "hard law" and little "soft law" pertaining
to transnational corporate accountability. The most notable "soft law"
is the single principle that calls for the promotion of corporate respon-
sibility in the Johannesburg Summit.'6 8 Nearly all "non-binding" as-
piring declarations are "soft law."' 169 "Hard law" is what lawyers use
at a domestic level. 7 ' Skeptics of "soft law" often call it "moralizing
without consequences." 171
Efforts to develop criminal law to punish international war crimes
have led to an increased awareness of the need to ensure individual re-
sponsibility for violating human rights in other countries. 172  This
awareness has even led to the acknowledgment of the right to a sus-
164. Rule, supra note 47, at 325.
165. See id; see also Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the
Right to Environment, 28 STAN. INT'L L.J. 103, 103-11 (1991) reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 66 (Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996) (stat-
ing that a right to environment is not often explicitly stated).
166. Id.
167. David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 901 (2003).
168. Johannesburg Summit, supra note 18, at 38. This principle calls to "actively pro-
mote corporate responsibility and accountability, including the full development and effective
implementation of intergovernmental agreements and measures, international initiatives and
public-private partnerships, and appropriate national regulations." Id.
169. NANDA & PRING, supra note 20, at 14. These non-binding statements can eventu-
ally make a profound contribution to international law. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Michelle Leighton Schwartz, International Legal Protection for Victims of Envi-
ronmental Abuse, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 355, 355-59 (1993), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 61 (Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996).
Genocide committed during World War IH sparked this idea of human rights provisions in in-
ternational law. Id.
17
Schmidt: Transnational Corporate Responsibility for International Environm
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
234 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
tainable global environment.173 An increasing number of human rights
activists have requested that the United Nations establish uniform le-
gal obligations for TNCs regarding human rights. 17 4 Until the U.N.
Norms were adopted, the activists' efforts were unsuccessful.
An initiative from Sub-Commission Resolution 1997/11 formed a
Working Group on Working Methods and Activities of Transnational
Corporations and requested a working document on human rights and
TNCs. 75 The Sub-Commission established a three-year period to al-
low a working group to evaluate TNCs and their operations.' 76  The
group gathered data regarding the effects of TNCs on human rights,
the environment, state obligations to regulate TNCs, and reconciling
investments and development with human rights.'77
After many drafts, the working group presented the final working
draft to the Sub-Commission at its 55th Session. 178 The document in-
cluded both human rights obligations and environmental requirements
for TNCs.179 With some minor changes, on August 13, 2003, the Sub-
Commission approved the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights in its Resolution 2003/16.180
B. Obligations Under the Norms181
Some say the Norms represent the opinio juris of the world com-
munity, as "soft law" often does.'82 The Norms address the increasing
international anxiety about TNCs' indifference towards sustainable
173. Id.
174. Rule, supra note 47, at 325.
175. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 902-03. Prior to the Sub-Committee's
initiative, many other attempts were made to develop some sort of program in this area. Id. at
902. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United Nations set out to draft an "international code of
conduct for businesses," which was unsuccessful. Id. In 1976, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development established its first Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises to promote corporate responsibility. Id. The International Labor Organization estab-
lished the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises in 1977.
Id. at 902-03. The Global Compact was then established. Id. at 903; see supra Part II.
176. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 903-04.
177. Id. at 904.
178. Id. at 906.
179, Id. at 921.
180. Id. at 906.
181. The discussion of the Norms is limited to those that apply to human rights and the
environment. For a full listing of all of the Norms, see Norms, supra note 7.
182. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12
MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 432 (1991), reprinted in DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 349, 356 (2d ed. 2002).
18
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development. 183  The Norms assert both the primary responsibility of
states and the obligation of TNCs to "promote, secure the fulfillment
of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights."'" This
statement is implicit in all the requirements set forth in the Norms. 185
Further, the commentary explains that the document applies to all
TNCs and other business enterprises and their activities in either the
home or host country. 186
The Norms also address the need for TNCs to respect indigenous
people. 187 This includes rights to "own, occupy, develop, control, pro-
tect, and use their lands, other natural resources, and cultural and intel-
lectual property.' 188  Moreover, Principle 12 of the Norms requires
TNCs to contribute to such rights as "development, adequate food and
drinking water, the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health, adequate housing .... -"89 The language in the Norms repre-
sents a shift in what the international community considers the proper
role and requirements of corporations regarding human rights. 190
The Norms also require TNCs to abide by international agree-
ments, principles, and standards regarding the environment in order to
"contribut[e] to the wider goal of sustainable development."' 191 In or-
der to fulfill this goal, TNCs must use their best management practices
and appropriate technologies.192 Furthermore, when TNCs cause ad-
183. Surya Deva, UN's Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?, 10 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 493, 509 (2004).
183. Norms, supra note 7, pmbl., para. 1.
184. Id.
185. This is a theme first asserted in the preamble and then reasserted in various Princi-
ples. Id
186. U.N. Cornm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights, Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
links/commentary-Aug2003.html [hereinafter Commentary].
187. Norms, supra note 7, para. 1.
188. Commentary, supra note 186, para. 10 cmt. c.
189. Norms, supra note 7, para. 12. These are all basic essentials the "North" has at
their disposal.
190. Deva, supra note 183, at 507.
191. Norms, supra note 7, para. 14.
192. Commentary, supra note 186, para. 14 cmt. g. The Commentary describes best
management practices as those that "enable their component entities to meet these environ-
mental objectives through the sharing of technology, knowledge and assistance, as well as
through environmental management systems, sustainability reporting, and reporting of antici-
pated or actual releases of hazardous and toxic substances." Id.
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verse conditions that may have endangered health, safety, or the envi-
ronment, they shall promptly alert anyone who may be affected. 193
The Norms also call for TNCs to make periodic assessments of
the impact of their activities on human rights and prepare impact
statements. 94 These statements must declare actions affecting human
rights and the environment, and any mitigating factors.' 95 Where an
assessment shows a violation of the Norms, the commentary requires
the business to include an action plan for reparation and redress. 196
The commentary discusses further action that may be required for any
violating claims, such as investigation. 197
Principle 14 states that TNCs shall operate in accordance with na-
tional laws, practices, and policies on preserving the environment of
the host country, in addition to any applicable international agree-
ments. 98 This requirement addresses the previous dilemma of which
standard should be followed-that of the home country, host country,
or international standards. 1
C. Implementation of the Norms
In addition to the obligations created, the Norms created a set of
guidelines to implement those obligations. As adopted, the Norms are
not an entirely voluntary initiative of corporate social responsibility.2 ',
The tone of voluntary compliance shifts midway through the Norms to
become more authoritative.201 The provisions discussing implementa-
tion show they do more than merely suggest a desired or model con-
duct.2 2 The Norms take a stance in the middle between strictly volun-
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at para. 16 cmt. h.
197. Id. para. 16 cmt. f.
198. Norms, supra note 7, para. 14.
199. See generally supra Part II. Additionally, many past international agreements have
very vague wording, therefore, it is easy for companies to comply with the wording rather
than the intentions. Deva, supra note 183, at 509.
Some critics argue the Norms could go one step further and require countries to comply with
the higher of the two standards: home or host. Id. (citing Surya Deva, Human Rights Stan-
dards and Multinational Corporations: Dilemma Between "Home" and "Rome," 7
MEDITERRANEAN J. HUM. RTs. 69, 87-89 (2003)).
Others suggest the corporation should always follow the home country's laws, which are of-
ten the higher of the two sets of standards. Id.
200. Rule, supra note 47, at 329.
201. Id.
202. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 913.
20
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tary programs like the Global Compact and "hard law" desired by
human rights organizations such as Amnesty International.2 3
The implementation methods are both indirect and direct.2°4 The
indirect obligations aim at allowing individual states to incorporate the
document and its ideas. 205 Direct obligations of TNCs, as exhibited in
Principles 15 and 16, are established through both internal and exter-
nal means.2°
The indirect implementing measures in Principle 17 require states
to "establish and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative
framework for ensuring that the Norms" are implemented by TNCs.2 °7
The Norms call on companies to disseminate these adopted rules in-
ternally.28 The United Nations requests that all relevant stakeholders,
including all people affected by the company's actions, understand the
meaning of the Norms and know about the responsibilities. 29 They
also publicize the responsibilities of the company,2t 0 which further in-
flicts and legitimizes their commitment. 21' The commentary stresses
that governments should not merely make this document known;
rather, they should use it as a model and integrate it into each coun-
try's culture.1 2 However, this arrangement leaves the impact of the
document entirely up to individual states.2 3 The Norms expect indi-
vidual states to establish the legal framework to force TNCs to comply
with the human rights standards established in the document. 214 Al-
though this theory is sound, states often align with their TNCs for
various reasons, 215 including economic growth.2 6
The direct obligations consist of internal mechanisms meant to
develop a corporate culture of respect for the rights of citizens in host
21countries. 17 The Norms also exhibit external means by proposing in-
203. Rule, supra note 47, at 328.
204. Deva, supra note 183, at 514.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Norms, supra note 7, para. 17.
208. Id. para. 15.
209. Commentary, supra note 186, para. 15 cmt. a.
210. See generally Norms, supra note 7.
211. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 916.
212. Commentary, supra note 186, para. 17 cmt. a.
213. See generally Deva, supra note 183, at 517.
214. Id. at 518.
215. Id. at 518-19. One reason many states feel compelled to support TNCs is their in-
fluence in the economy. Id. These companies are often a huge influence of national economy,
growth and development. Id.
216. See discussion of the pressures of economic growth infra Part V.B.
217. Deva, supra note 183, at 515.
21
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dependent and transparent periodic monitoring and verification by the
United Nations and other international and national mechanisms. 18
Sub-Commission Resolution 2003/16 called for NGOs and others to
adopt a method of reporting corporations' failure to comply with the
standards established in the Norms.219 Principle 18 asserts TNCs must
issue prompt and adequate damages to persons and communities ad-
versely affected by failure to comply with responsibilities.22 °
The Norms consider multiple monitoring and verifying methods at
both the international and national level.2 21 The ideas proposed in the
document are still not completely developed and some argue there is
no definitive framework.22  Nevertheless, there is no reason the
Norms cannot be made more definite and "more binding in the fu-
ture. 22
3
D. Effect of the Norms
The Norms establish a rather comprehensive set of obligations.
Yet, critics argue that the Norms will not have a substantial effect on
the international community and TNCs. 224 However, there are several
key indications that show the Sub-Commission's degree of serious-
ness and its commitment to changing how TNCs operate.225
Detractors say the Norms are nothing more than a summary "of
existing international human rights laws. '226 However, existing inter-
national human rights laws were not intended to directly apply to non-
state actors.227 Therefore, enforcement mechanisms were not provided
to compel TNCs to comply with requirements of existing human
rights laws. 228 Creating a code of conduct aimed specifically at the ac-
tions of TNCs operating in another country is an unprecedented
step.
229
218. Norms, supra note 7, para. 16.
219. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 913.
220. Norms, supra note 7, para. 18.
221. Id.
222. Deva, supra note 183, at 520.
223. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 915.
224. Rule, supra note 47, at 326.
225. Deva, supra note 183, at 499.
226. Rule, supra note 47, at 326.
227. Deva, supra note 183, at 498. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12,
1948).
228. Deva, supra note 183, at 498.
229. Id. at 499.
22
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2005], Art. 16
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol36/iss1/16
2005] TNC'S RESPONS1IILITY FOR INT'L ENVT'L AND HR VIOLATIONS 239
Another major difference between the Norms and previous efforts
is its terminology. When discussing compliance, the Norms substitute
standard terms like "should" with "shall. '23° Therefore, the Norms are
not merely a restatement of existing obligations, but rather an effort to
fill the voids of previous agreements and mandate certain aspects of
international corporate responsibility.
The conclusion of the Preamble proclaims "that every effort be
made so that [the Norms] become generally known and respected. 231
Critics will argue that this language is not binding or is at best un-
clear.232 The Danish Institute on Human Rights claims the Norms are
not fully operational at their current state of development. 23  Regard-
less, the spirit of "soft law" is that while it is not legally binding, it is
still significant.2 3
The Norms are both a departure from previous agreements and a
sign of progress, however subtle. 235  The inclusion of implementing
provisions represents a notable shift. This shift may signify the inter-
national community's unstated conclusion: the voluntary compliance
called for in previous documents is proving to be inadequate, 236 just as
human rights groups have asserted.237 Voluntary compliance means
that there are few incentives or sanctions to demand adherence, there
is no common body of enforcement, and negotiation and diplomacy
are the primary ways of handling violations. 238 As a result, many na-
tions refuse to consider themselves bound by "soft" rules that only
modestly protect human rights and the environment.2 3 9
230. Id.
231. Norms, supra note 7, pmbl.
232. Rule, supra note 47, at 328.
233. Letter from Christina Schultz, Project Manager, The Human Rights & Bus. Pro-
ject, The Danish Inst. for Human Rights, to Dzidek Kedzia, Chief of the Research and Rights
Dev. Branch, Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization[business/docs/danishinstitute.doc (last vis-
ited Dec. 8, 2005).
234. Dupuy, supra 182, at 254.
235. Deva, supra note 183, at 501.
236. Id. at 496.
237. See supra Parts 11, fL.A discussing the position of human rights organizations in
more detail.
238. NANDA & PRING, supra note 20, at 19.
239. Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 259, 264-66 (1992), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY
13 (Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996); Harvard Law Review Association, De-
velopments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1504-
506 (1991), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 15 (Anthony
D'Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996).
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Although the Norms may seem somewhat inconsequential and
non-binding, they may be more powerful than a mere request for vol-
untary conduct. Often a "soft" norm can help shape the model of
good behavior, which the world has come to expect from a "well-
governed [s]tate. '' 240 "Soft law" alone can have tremendous influence
and force. 241  Regional human rights commissions and courts can
make use of the Norms and cite them as persuasive authority in deter-
mining states' obligations.242
The legal authority of the Norms is now somewhat derivative
from current sources in international law.243 In the future, however,
this could be expanded to become more binding.2" Often "soft law"
is the first step to becoming customary international binding law. It is
apparent that an extensive part of "soft law," which makes a substan-
tial impression, often defines what eventually becomes "hard law. 245
The crucial question is whether these Norms are enough. Clearly,
they represent a step in the right direction-especially with direct fo-
cus on TNCs. The Norms definitely have the potential to be an in-
terim stride toward becoming binding law, which controversial inter-
national law often does. Human rights organizations argue that "hard
law," which would bind TNCs and other businesses, is needed - and
quickly.246 They claim this is the only adequate way of protecting in-
ternational human rights.247 They insist that only binding law with ex-
240. Dupuy, supra note 182, at 357.
241. NANDA & PRING, supra note 20, at 14.
242. See infra Part V.A discussing the Norms as persuasive authority when determining
state's obligations.
243. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 915.
244. Id.
245. Dupuy, supra note 182, at 357.
246. But see Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Procreation of the Environment: A
Mildly "Revisionist" View, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 117, 119-20, 133, 135, 137-38 (A. Cancado Trindade ed.), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 68-69 (Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten
Engel eds., 1996) (arguing the possible negative effects of creating a generic environmental
human right and proposing instead that the laws be based on "recogniz[ing] the intrinsic merit
of protecting nature for nature's sake").
247. See Rule, supra note 47, at 325. Currently without using international agreements,
which are not binding, a host country has a limited number of options to pursue legal justice.
The government may file a criminal lawsuit, or its citizens may file a civil suit in the host
country.
If the TNC is based in the United States, a suit may also be filed in the United States under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, established in 1789. Jonathon Zittrain, Alien Tort Claims Act,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/torts3y/readings/update-a-02.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2005)
(Zittrain is a professor at Harvard University Law School).
In 1991, Congress passed the Torture Victim Prevention Act, which specified what the origi-
nal Act implicitly stated. Id. The Act allows aliens to sue TNCs, based in the United States,
24
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plicit enforcement mechanisms, will stop these TNCs from abusing
human rights and the environment. 248 In light of the case against
Newmont, they seem to be correct. "Soft law," like the Norms, is just
not enough to stop corporations from the grave abuse that occurs
globally.
V. IMPACT OF THE NORMS ON THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENT
A. Using the Norms in Their Current State
Whatever the inadequacies may be in the current Norms, Indone-
sia and other countries can still make use of the Norms as persuasive
authority when filing suit. In the case against Newmont, the Indone-
sian government could have made reference to the Norms in its briefs.
Courts and regional human rights commissions can also cite to the
Norms.24 9 Although the Norms may not be concrete, 250 countries can
reference them just as they are until more binding authority exists.
Though binding international law is needed, the Norms can have a
considerable effect in their current state. States have been found to
view "soft law" as having at least some political significance.25' Some
states even consider it necessary to abide by such obligations, just as if
"soft law" were a binding legal requirement.252 Furthermore, in the
absence of precise legal standards in international cases, there is an in-
creasing trend for national courts to apply international "soft law,"
provided it has sufficient state support. 3
Regional courts can cite to the Norms when determining the re-
quirements of states and encouraging them to scrutinize corporations'
conduct within their jurisdiction.254 Often "soft law" is considered too
for violations of international law against human ights as a violation of U.S. domestic law.
Id.
Today, this legal avenue, though not always practical because filing a lawsuit in a foreign
country presents its own obstacles, does provide an additional option. Furthermore, an appli-
cant cannot even bring an environmental law complaint in an international forum because
there is not one. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 11, at 682.
248. See Rule, supra note 47, at 325.
249. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 919.
250. See Deva, supra note 183, at 520.
251. Dupuy, supra note 182, at 354.
252. Id.
253. NANDA AND PRING, supra note 20, at 15 (citing George Pring et al., Trends in In-
ternational Environmental Law Affecting the Minerals Industry, 17 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 39, 163 (1999)).
254. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 919.
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vague to provide any authority when applying these rules to dis-
putes; 25 however, this is not the case with the Norms. They can be
cited as persuasive legal authority when a TNC violates the environ-
mental rights of indigenous people in developing countries, which is
the case with Newmont in Indonesia.256
The Norms deal directly with indigenous people and their envi-
ronment,257 which could help establish responsibility for TNCs like
Newmont. Principle 12 specifically gives the right to adequate food
and drinking water,258 something citizens of Buyat Pantai no longer
have because their fish and drinking water have been contaminated.
Principle 12 further asserts that TNCs shall refrain from activities that
"obstruct or impede the realization of those rights." 59 In its current
suit against Newmont, Indonesia could use Principle 12 as support
when it asserts Newmont was aware of the damage it was causing.26°
The Norms also compel TNCs to abide by international principles
with regard to the environment and human rights and conduct their ac-
tivities in a way that contributes to sustainable development. 26' When
Newmont allegedly polluted Buyat Bay, it destroyed land and poten-
tially the life and livelihood of the Indonesian indigenous people,
thereby undermining sustainable development. Newmont also failed
to abide by Indonesian law 262 as mandated by the Norms when they
assert that TNCs must conform to national laws and regulations relat-
ing to preserving the environment of the states in which they oper-
ate.263
Two recent decisions264 of the European Court of Human Rights
have held states liable for failing to abide by international regula-
tions.265 They also charged states for failing to follow through with
inspections, which can often avert corporate misbehavior. 266 Both
255. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 239, at 14-15.
256. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 919-20.
257. See supra Part IV.B discussing the Norms' obligations.
258. Norms, supra note 7, para. 12. This could also apply in the Peruvian case against
Newmont. See supra Part ILI.A for a discussion on Newmont's alleged improprieties in Peru.
259. Id.
260. Newmont denies any wrongdoing and subsequently being aware of any damage it
was causing. See supra Part 1l discussing the allegations against Newmont.
261. Norms, supra note 7, para. 14.
262. See supra Part II.B discussing the charges against Newmont.
263. Norms, supra note 7, para. 14.
264. Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 357
(1998); Lopez Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 20 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 277
(1994).
265. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 919, n. 119.
266. Id.
26
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cases involved corporations that polluted the environment, a violation
of family and private life under the European Convention on Human
Rights.267 The courts can refer to the Norms in deciding corporate ac-
countability.268 Furthermore, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights could have cited to the Norms in holding the Nigerian
government liable269 for its involvement with regional oil compa-
nies. 270 The court held the government responsible for "its involve-
ment in, and failure to limit, the activities of oil companies that were
violating... environmental rights of the Ogoni residents. 27'
B. The Need for Binding International Regulation
Business analysts are watching the Indonesian situation closely.272
Foreign miners are concerned about the "difficulty" of operating in
Indonesia and the region due to the recent prosecution against New-
mont.273 The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta even warned that the Indone-
sian government's role in this case would deter investors.274 Again,
there is the demand that developing countries trade health for devel-
opment. The case places Indonesian President Susilo Bambang, who
has repeatedly emphasized the need to attract foreign investors to the
country, in a delicate position.275 Indonesia's Mining Association
chairman, Benny Wahyu, questions how a country can "invite people
to invest if the government is pursuing cases like this[.]" 276 However,
this hesitation may simply be a way to influence the Indonesian gov-
ernment and its prosecution of Newmont. TNCs are multi-billion-
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. See generally Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Eco-
nomic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, 2001-2002 Annual Activity Report
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Annex V, at 31 (detailing various
reasons for the Nigerian court's decision).
270. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 920.
271. Id.
272. Civil Suit Withdrawn, supra note 83. See generally Donnan & Hidayat, supra note
153. Some business analysts have sharply criticized the Indonesian government's pursuit of
the case "as unduly harsh and likely to discourage investment." US $543m Suit Against
Newmont Halted, supra note 83.
273. Anjani, supra note 91.
274. Goodenough, supra note 3. The Sierra Club responded by saying that the Em-
bassy's standpoint is a "dangerous example of. . . misguided foreign policy." Press Release,
Sierra Club, Sierra Club Criticizes Embassy Defense of Mining Company (Sept. 27, 2004),
http://www.sierraclub.org/human-rights/press-yelease-mining.asp [hereinafter Sierra Club
Press Release].
275. Timothy Mapes, Jakarta Adopts Report Charging Newmont with Polluting Ocean,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2004, available at http://www.infid.be/buyatnewmont.htm.
276. Id.
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dollar companies with enough money to threaten developing countries
that rely on investments for growth. With the money that TNCs have,
they can influence poorer countries by offering them development in
exchange for their environment and health.
Indonesia has an abundance of natural resources, 277 which are
prime targets for TNCs like Newmont. Unfortunately, many corpora-
tions are willing to deplete another country's resources before deplet-
ing their own.278 Furthermore, although international standards are
becoming more common, most are still "soft law" and developing
countries' standards are less stringent than those regulating industrial-
ized countries.
Companies such as Newmont seem to dismiss even binding na-
tional law. Newmont has a record of violating the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's standards in its local operations and apparently
disregards any sort of voluntary obligations. 279  The international
community should not assume Newmont will quietly acquiesce to
"soft law" like the Norms.
This problem is one significant reason why an international set of
binding regulations is absolutely necessary. Governments confronting
economic power and pressure of multibillion-dollar companies can be
assisted by the Norms in identifying and applying the minimum inter-
national standards for corporate contact on their land. 280 The Norms
are a step in the right direction, but they are not binding. The Norms
do not have adequate monitoring and verifying methods, however,
they could easily be, and need to be, strengthened.
Furthermore, there is still no mandatory enforcement other than
what states choose. There are multiple mechanisms available to aid in
enforcement. Technology such as satellite surveillance can spot ille-
gal activity, which would help countries stop illegal water dumping.281
A study of Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, and the Philippines found that
countries need more stringent methods to detect, arrest, prosecute,
fine, and convict perpetrators.282 The Norms could fill this void by
creating stricter monitoring and more severe penalties. In order to
277. Perlez, supra note 93.
278. The U.S. reliance on Middle Eastern oil versus tapping into Alaska's oil reserves
or drilling off the California coast are good examples of a country's reluctance to use their
own recourses, when a cheaper alternative is available.
279. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of Newmont's environmental record in the
United States.
280. See generally Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 167, at 922 (articulating the devel-
opment and application of the Norms as an effective means of monitoring TNCs).
281. Environmental Crimes, supra note 23, at 244.
282. Id.
28
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protect developing nations from being exploited, a set of international
regulations is crucial.
The Norms give state governments a stronger foundation on
which to stand when demanding businesses stop harming the envi-
ronment. However, the Norms cannot protect indigenous people in
developing countries when they seldom see their day in court. Many
potential plaintiffs never have an opportunity to present their case due
to lack of resources-primarily, the finances it takes to go up against a
TNC. With economic pressure and threats by TNCs, many plaintiffs
never get to present their claims. TNCs are powerful and can coerce
citizens to drop any claims against them. The executives at TNCs also
have the ability to easily persuade people because they appear to be
educated, successful individuals. For the Norms to be most effective,
it must be presumed that individual TNCs will adopt the Norms and
cases will actually be brought to enforce them. To make such pre-
sumptions is not very realistic; therefore, binding law that protects
people and enables cases to be pursued is essential.2"3
If every nation is forced to abide by the same laws, investors will
not be able to pick and choose a country to invest in based on whether
or not that country prosecutes companies who destroy the environ-
ment. TNCs would not be able to evaluate which country would al-
low for the largest profit based on its weak environmental standards,
lack of prosecution for polluting the environment, or harm to the
health of its people. Countries would no longer be forced into trading
health for economic development. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to
require non-governmental organizations, like Earthworks, to file suit.
Multibillion-dollar companies have an unfair advantage over non-
profit organizations. A uniform set of binding principles is necessary
to level the playing field.
Once a set of binding law is available, countries will be alleviated
of the pressure to determine whether or not they should prosecute.
Such laws would place the responsibility and enforcement in the
hands of the international community. Developing countries search-
ing for employment opportunities, development, and better lives for
283. Clearly, there are very real obstacles to such binding rules, which is one reason
they do not exist today. Several major hurdles include state sovereignty, jurisdiction, political
power of TNCs, defining international environmental human rights and addressing cultural
relativism. See Diana Ayton-Shenker, United Nations Background Note: The Challenge of
Human Rights and Cultural Diversity, U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFORMATION, Mar. 1995,
http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm; see also David A. Taylor, Is Environmental Health a
Basic Human Right? 112 ENVT'L. HEALTH PERSP. A1006 (2004), available at
http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/2004/112-17/spheres.html.
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their citizens would no longer be forced to choose jobs and economic
development over health and the environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.N.'s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights ask that TNCs act in ecologically responsible ways rather than
causing undue harm to the air, water, and land of their host countries.
Because the Norms are the first code of conduct to address TNCs di-
rectly, the Norms represent a significant stride and will have an impact
on international environmental law.
However, the Norms are simply not enough. For-profit degrada-
tion of the natural resources on which indigenous people depend for
sustenance must be stopped. Only the creation and enforcement of
binding international laws will stop the degradation. Mere voluntary
obligations are not sufficient to compel environmentally responsible
behavior from a corporation that consistently demonstrates a marked
disregard for the health and safety of indigenous people in pursuit of
its own bottom line. The actions of Newmont Mining Corporation in
Buyat Pantai clearly show the need for more than non-binding guide-
lines and discretionary state enforcement.
The Norms are insufficient in several areas. They allow states to
set their own standards and enforcement mechanisms. States should
not be put in the unfair position of feeling compelled to trade clean air
and water for the economic "progress" TNCs bring. A set of binding
international principles is necessary to ensure states act in the best in-
terest of their people and environment. TNCs must be prevented from
using their substantial economic influence and political pressure to
persuade individual states not to enforce environmental guidelines or
prosecute infractions. Choice should not be involved in situations
with such dire costs.
Instead, the international community must unite to develop a set
of regulations that are binding on TNCs. A binding set of law would
alleviate pressure on individual developing countries and mandate that
all states follow a uniform set of standards, rather than one set for in-
dustrialized countries and one for developing nations. TNCs should
not have the option to choose to operate in one country versus another
based on its weak environmental standards.
The Norms lead activists closer to their ultimate goal. However, it
is binding international environmental regulation that will have the
power to truly protect human rights and benefit every citizen of every
30
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nation, including those of Buyat Pantai. Only then will nations be
able to both protect their environment and foster their economy. As
Stephen Mills, the director of the Sierra Club's International Program
expressed, "[n]o country or community should be pressured into ac-
cepting that its children will be poisoned in exchange for develop-
ment.""28
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